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THE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS: THE UNRECOGNIZED
RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY FOR JEOPARDY
ASSESSED TAXPAYERS
The sixteenth amendment to the Constitution granted Con-
gress the right to impose and collect taxes on income.1 As with any
government action, however, the requirements of due process as
provided in the fifth amendment 2 restrain the exercise of this power.
The Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") empowers the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (the "Service") to assess and seize a taxpayer's
assets and attach liens encumbering his property without notice or a
hearing3 if the Service determines that collection of the funds "will
be jeopardized by delay."' 4 Should the taxpayer disagree with the
1 U.S. CONST. amend XVI. The sixteenth amendment provides: "The Congress
shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,
without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or
enumeration." Prior to the enactment of the sixteenth amendment, Congress's taxing
power was limited by article 1, section 9, clause 4, which prevented any direct taxation
unless in proportion to the census. In Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S.
429 (initial decision), 158 U.S. 601 (decision on rehearing) (1895), the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional the Income Tax Act of 1894. The Court characterized the Act,
which had imposed a tax on income derived from real estate and from personal property
without apportionment, as a direct tax, which article 1, section 9, clause 4 forbids. Id
Eighteen years later, the states ratified the sixteenth amendment, and Congress subse-
quently enacted the first income tax the same year. SeeJOHN E. NOWAK, RONALD D. Ro-
TUNDA & J. NELSON YOUNG, CONSTITrrONAL LAW 183 (3d ed. 1986). Pollock was
explicitly overruled in 1988 in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505.
2 The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "No person
shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. " But see
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916). In Brushaber, a taxpayer challenged the
income tax on the basis of a denial of due process. The Court held that:
So far as the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is relied
upon, it suffices to say that there is no basis for such reliance since it is
equally well settled that such clause is not a limitation upon the taxing
power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution; in other words, that
the Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring upon the one
hand a taxing power and taking the same power away on the other by the
limitations of the due process clause.
Id. at 24. This Note, however, does not challenge the constitutionality of the income tax
under the fifth amendment due process clause, but rather the manner in which Congress
has implemented it.
3 See infra text accompanying notes 20-31.
4 I.R.C. § 6851, the Termination Assessment provision, allows the Service to ter-
minate the taxpayer's taxable year and assess a deficiency for federal income tax "[i]f the
Secretary finds that a taxpayer designs quickly to depart from the United States or to
remove his property therefrom, or to conceal himself or his property therein, or to do
any other act ... tending to prejudice or to render wholly or partially ineffectual pro-
ceedings to collect the income tax for the current or the immediately preceding taxable
year unless such proceeding be brought without delay ...." I.R.C. § 6861 allows the
Service to immediately assess income, estate, and gift taxes for a taxable year which has
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assessment, he must sue the Service, which has already seized his
assets, for a refind. This is often difficult, however, because in
many cases the Service has left the taxpayer with no assets to pay an
attorney.5
Taxpayers have argued that procedural due process requires
that they have the assistance of counsel to litigate their claims
against the government, and they have attempted to persuade the
courts to release funds from the seized property for this purpose.6
Courts have uniformly denied this request, holding that they cannot
determine whether a party's constitutional rights have been violated
until a post-trial study of the case.7
Traditionally, the cases that examine the constitutional right to
counsel focus on whether due process demands that the federal gov-
ernment provide an indigent party with counsel free of charge. An
important issue implicit in these traditional cases, however, is
whether the right to counsel exists at all for these litigants,8 regard-
ended, "[i]f the Secretary believes that the assessment or collection of a deficiency...
will be jeopardized by delay .. " I.R.C. § 6862 authorizes the Service to immediately
assess any tax other than income, estate, and gift taxes for a taxable year which has ended
"[i]f the Secretary believes that the collection ... will be jeopardized by delay .... "
This Note addresses only § 6861 concerns: jeopardy assessment of income, estate, and
gift taxes.
5 See Rosenblum v. United States, 549 F.2d 1140, 1141 (8th Cir.) (After Service
jeopardy assessed the taxpayers and then levied against moneys paid to taxpayers' attor-
ney to represent taxpayers in the Tax Court, attorney sued the United States arguing
that "the seizure by the IRS, including the seizure of the money paid to [the attorney],
has deprived the taxpayers of their alleged constitutional right to be represented by
competent tax counsel in the litigation ... which litigation plaintiffs describe as being
complicated and technical."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1977); Lloyd v. Patterson, 242
F.2d 742, 743 (5th Cir. 1957) (jeopardy assessed taxpayer contended that unless permit-
ted access to assessed funds, he would be unable to retain counsel); United States v.
Brodson, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.) (Defendant in criminal tax evasion case argued that the
pendency of a civil jeopardy assessment case prevented him from obtaining the assist-
ance of counsel, here, an accountant. The court found that future events may occur
which would obviate the necessity of releasing funds; for example, an accountant may
volunteer his aid, or a "friend may gratuitously furnish defendant with the services of an
accountant." Id at 109), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957); Shapiro v. Commissioner, 73
T.C. 313 (1979), appeal dismissed, 632 F.2d 170 (2d Cir.), appeal dismissed, 633 F.2d 206
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1082 (1981); Human Eng'g Inst. v. Commissioner,
61 T.C. 61 (1973) (recognizing the "difficult position" of the taxpayer who must sue the
same government who seized his total assets pursuant to a jeopardy assessment, yet
feeling constrained by precedent to refuse the release of funds to pay an attorney). The
court held that the due process issue must be decided post-trial. Id.
6 See Lloyd, 242 F.2d at 742; Brodson, 241 F.2d at 107; Shapiro, 73 T.C. at 313;
Human Eng'g Inst., 61 T.C. at 61.
7 Lloyd, 242 F.2d at 744; Brodson, 241 F.2d at 110; Shapiro, 73 T.C. at 315; Human
Eng'g Inst., 61 T.C. at 67.
8 Along similar lines, some have argued that the constitutional right to counsel
should be extended to litigants in other types of civil disputes. See, e.g., Mark S. Blaskey,
University Students' Right to Retain Counsel for Disciplinary Proceedings, 24 CAL. W.L. REv. 65
(1988) (proposing that inasmuch as university students subjected to a disciplinary hear-
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less of who pays the attorney's fees. If the right to counsel does not
exist in the circumstances of a particular case, then logically there is
no right to appointed counsel either.
Part I of this Note examines the application of the Code's jeop-
ardy assessment provision,9 explains the history of the jeopardy as-
sessment,10 explores the remedies available to a taxpayer faced with
ajeopardy assessment," and reveals the insufficiency of these reme-
dies.12 Part II reviews the evolution of the constitutional right to
counsel in the criminal context,13 and its extension to some civil
cases.' 4 Part III analyzes jeopardy assessments in light of this
emerging right to counsel in civil cases.
This Note concludes that a taxpayer should have the right to
assistance of counsel if the government has seized his funds pursu-
ant to a jeopardy assessment. However, this right should not re-
quire the government to provide the taxpayer with court-appointed
counsel at the expense of other taxpayers. Rather, Congress should
amend the Code to require that courts establish and administer es-
crow accounts holding the seized funds. Courts could thereby en-
sure that the funds remained available to the government should it
ultimately prevail and at the same time provide for payment of rea-
sonable attorney fees to protect the interests of the individual.
Thus, the purpose of the jeopardy assessment would be fulfilled
without depriving the taxpayer of the assistance of counsel.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Assessment
Before the Service may collect taxes, it first must assess them' 5
by noting in its records that taxes are owing and due. The Code
authorizes the Service to assess taxes only under certain conditions.
First, it may assess the amount which the taxpayer determined he
ing are placed into an environment similar to that of a criminal prosecution--charges
are brought, and witnesses testify and are cross examined-they should have the right to
obtain counsel to represent them); Note, The Right to Appointed Counsel for Indigent Civil
Litigants: The Demands of Due Process, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 627 (1989) (authored by
William L. Dick, Jr.) (1989) (suggesting that termination of parental status and paternity
actions are cases requiring a right to counsel, at least in most instances).
9 See infra text accompanying notes 15-31.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 32-65.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 66-81.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 66-81.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 82-102.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 103-19.
15 I.R.C. § 6502(a) provides: "Where the assessment of any tax imposed by this
title has been made ... such tax may be collected ...."
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owed and indicated on his tax return. 16 Second, it may assess any
additional amount which the taxpayer would have shown as due and
payable on his tax return but for a computational error.'7 Third,
the Code provides for the judicial determination of a tax assessment
in the event that the Service disagrees with the taxpayer's determi-
nation of his own tax liability.18 This Note addresses the fourth
method of assessment-that is, assessments made under the Code's
jeopardy provisions, which collectively provide for the immediate
assessment and collection of any tax deficiency upon the Service's
determination that the need for such immediate action exists.
B. Section 6861
Code section 6861 allows the Service to depart from its usual
system of tax assessment and collection' 9 to meet the demands of
exigent circumstances: the Service may jeopardy assess taxes when
it believes that collection of a deficiency would be "jeopardized by
delay." 20 Because of the government's perceived need to act as
quickly as possible to secure possession of the funds or other assets,
most of the safeguards which protect non-jeopardy assessed taxpay-
ers do not apply to the jeopardy taxpayer. First, the non-jeopardy
taxpayer may voluntarily pay the deficiency asserted by the Service
and then sue for a refund in a post-payment forum, 21 or he may
16 Id. § 6201(a)(1).
17 Id. § 6213(b)(1).
18 The Code empowers the Service to send to the taxpayer a "notice of deficiency,"
which indicates, essentially, the amount of tax imposed by the Service which exceeds the
amount the taxpayer showed on his return as owing. Id. §§ 6211, 6212(a). The notice
of deficiency informs the taxpayer of the Service's determination of his taxes and gives
the taxpayer 90 days within which to dispute the asserted tax liability. If the taxpayer
disputes this deficiency, he may file a petition in the Tax Court for the redetermination
of his tax liability, and thereby prevent the Service from assessing the deficiency until the
judiciary makes a final determination. Id. § 6213(a). If the taxpayer does not file a peti-
tion with the Tax Court within ninety days, the Service may assess the deficiency and
collect the tax. Id.
19 See supra note 18 for a brief explanation of the standard method of assessment
and collection.
20 I.R.C. § 6861. Collection might be considered to be "jeopardized by delay," for
example, "if a taxpayer attempts to leave the U.S. or to remove his property from the
U.S. while there is any dispute concerning his tax liability for a past year, IRS may make
ajeopardy assessment." Fed. Tax Coordinator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) para. T-3601 (Oct.
29, 1987).
In addition, there is a presumption that collection will be jeopardized by delay if an
individual in possession of cash in an amount greater than $10,000 denies ownership of
it, and does not claim that it belongs to another individual who does acknowledge own-
ership. I.R.C. § 6867(a).
21 In a non-jeopardy situation, if the taxpayer and the Service do not settle, the
taxpayer receives his "ticket to the Tax Court"-the 90-day notice of deficiency-before
the assessment and before the Service may begin collection. If the taxpayer chooses to
pay the asserted tax liability before litigation, the taxpayer may sue for a refund in either
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choose to delay assessment and payment of taxes by litigating the
determination of his t~ax liability in the Tax Court.22 The jeopardy
taxpayer has no such choice: he cannot litigate prior to assessment
and payment because the government has already forced him to
"pay" by seizing his assets. Second, to assess the jeopardy taxpayer,
the Service need only assert the "reasonable belief" that the gov-
ernment's ability to collect the money or property will be jeopard-
ized by delay.23 In contrast to the non-jeopardy situation, the
Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate has sole discretion to make
this determination, 24 without any preassessment judicial approval. 25
Finally, after the Service makes an assessment in a non-jeopardy sit-
uation, it must send the taxpayer a notice of levy (or seizure) and
then wait ten days before resorting to self-help remedies and seizing
the taxpayer's assets. 26 This protection does not apply to the jeop-
ardy assessed taxpayer,27 whose funds and other assets may be
seized even before he receives a notice of deficiency. 28 Although
the Service must send the taxpayer a written statement that includes
the information it relied on in making the jeopardy assessment, the
Service need not send this notice until five days after it makes the
assessment. 29 The Service will virtually always seize a jeopardy as-
sessed taxpayer's property before it is compelled to send the notice,
because any notice to the jeopardy taxpayer before collection would
defeat the purpose of the jeopardy provision. That is, if a taxpayer
were inclined to leave the country to avoid paying his taxes, he
would likely do so immediately upon receiving notice of an impend-
ing seizure of his assets.30 Thus, the Service seizes the jeopardy as-
sessed taxpayer's property before giving him any notice and without
any prior judicial determination. 31
the United States Claims Court (formerly the Court of Claims) or the federal district
court that has jurisdiction over him.
22 See infra text accompanying notes 35-36.
23 Transport Mfg. & Equip. Co. v. Trainor, 382 F.2d 793 (8th Cir. 1967); see also
I.R.C. § 7429, which permits the United States district courts to review a jeopardy as-
sessment to determine whether it is "reasonable under the circumstances." For a dis-
cussion of I.R.C. § 7429, see infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
24 Transport Mfg., 382 F.2d at 799.
25 In addition to the absence of preassessment judicial approval, no meaningful
statutory guidelines exist for determining when collection will be jeopardized by delay.
Therein lies a great risk of abuse. Charles H. Gustafson,Judicial Review offeopardy Tax
Collection: Sentence First, Verdict Afterwards, 26 CASE W. REs. 315, 316 (1976).
26 I.R.C. § 6331(a).
27 Id. § 6331(d)(3).
28 Id. § 6861(b). For the jeopardy assessed taxpayer, the Service does not have to
send a notice of deficiency until 60 days after making the assessment. Id.
29 Id. § 7429(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 301.7429-1 (1990).
30 See Note, Assessing Internal Revenue Service Jeopardy Procedures: Recent Legislative and
Judicial Reforms, 26 CLEV. ST. L. Rsv. 413, 418 (1977) (authored by Margaret M. Armen).
31 There is judicial review to determine whether the "reasonable belief" was in-
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C. History of the Jeopardy Assessment
1. Legislative History: The Origin of the Statute 3 2
Before the enactment of the first jeopardy provision in 1924, 3
federal law required an individual to pay whatever tax the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (now the Internal Revenue Service) alleged to be
due, before he was provided with a forum in which to litigate the
actual amount of debt. Thus, the pay-first method of tax collection
was originally the exclusive procedure for all taxpayers. 34
The Revenue Act of 1924 created both thejeopardy provision35
and the Board of Tax Appeals (now the United States Tax Court), as
a forum for prepayment disputes. Congress recognized that "[t]he
right of appeal after payment of the tax is an incomplete remedy,
and does little to remove the hardship occasioned by an incorrect
assessment."36 However, Congress limited the use of the Board of
Tax Appeals to non-jeopardy taxpayers.3 7 Before the creation of
the Board of Tax Appeals, any taxpayer lacking sufficient capital to
pay a large assessment would have had to borrow money to pay the
assessment before litigating the true amount of the debt. The tax-
payer who could not satisfy the assessment could expect to have the
government seize his assets to pay the tax. In some cases this meant
the taxpayer would incur serious hardship, such as the loss of a busi-
ness. If a court ultimately rejected the amount of the assessment,
the taxpayer may have been financially ruined even though he never
owed any taxes.
The overhaul of the assessment process included a substantial
extension of the amount of time between the initial issuance of a
deficiency notice and the ultimate payment by the taxpayer.3 8 Con-
gress created the jeopardy assessment to protect the government's
interests during this extended time frame.3 9 The new jeopardy as-
deed reasonable, and as to the reasonableness of the amount, if any, of the assessment.
See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
32 See Note, supra note 30, at 418, for additional discussion of the legislative
history.
33 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(d), 43 Stat. 297.
34 The first income tax was enacted in 1913, but the first prepayment forum did not
exist until 1924.
35 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 274(d), 43 Stat. 297.
36 H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., at 7 (1924).
37 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(a), 43 Stat. 336.
38 Before the 1924 Act, the government could collect deficiencies in as few as 40
days after the mailing of the notice of deficiency. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 136,
§ 250(d), 42 Stat. 265, 266 (repealed 1924). The 1924 Act provided for a 60-day period
(now extended to 90 days) in which the taxpayer could appeal to the Board of Tax Ap-
peals before paying. Naturally, the ultimate decision of the Board of Tax Appeals would
not come until months or years after the taxpayer initiated the appeal. Note, supra note
30, at 418 n.37.
39 Note, supra note 30, at 418.
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sessment would help ensure that a taxpayer would not leave the ju-
risdiction or render himself judgment-proof, before paying his
taxes.4
0
2. Constitutional Issues: The Jeopardy Assessment Per Se Does Not
Violate Due Process 41
The jeopardy assessment is an extremely harsh and unusual
provision-one that seems to run contrary to the protections of the
due process clause at the core of our judicial system. Nevertheless,
courts have upheld its constitutionality.
In Phillips v. Commissioner,42 the Coombe Garment Company had
distributed its assets to its stockholders prior to dissolution. 43 The
Bureau of Internal Revenue (the "Bureau") subsequently assessed
the defunct company but collected only a small portion of the
taxes. 44 In addition, the Bureau assessed Phillips on the theory that
he was liable as a stockholder-transferee of the corporate funds
owed the government.45 Phillips protested that the government vio-
lated his due process rights, because the Bureau made the assess-
ment without first litigating the underlying issue of whether
transferee liability could exist on the facts of that case. 46
The Supreme Court held that although the government made
the assessment without a hearing, summary assessment procedures
satisfy due process requirements as long as the taxpayer has an op-
portunity for "eventual judicial review."' 47 In reaching this determi-
nation, Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, distinguished
property rights from rights to life and liberty48 and cited other in-
stances where government necessity outweighed property rights:
the forced destruction of property to protect public health, the sum-
mary seizure of property during wartime, and the acquisition of
40 Id.
41 See supra note 2. See also Note, supra note 30, at 420-27 (discussing cases that
establish the constitutionality ofjeopardy provisions).
42 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
43 Id. at 591.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 591-92. Distributees of assets of a dissolved corporation were liable to
discharge unpaid corporate taxes. The transferred liability could be enforced in the
same manner as that of any other delinquent taxpayer. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27,
§ 280, 44 Stat. 61 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 6901 (1988)). For a discussion of
transferee liability for delinquent taxes, see Phillips, 283 U.S. at 592-94 nn.2-4.
46 Phillips, 283 U.S. at 593.
47 Id. at 597 (citing Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. (12 Otto) 586 (1880); Scot-
tish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bowland, 196 U.S. 611 (1905)). Although prior cases
examined the constitutionality of summary proceedings in tax cases, see Phillips, 283 U.S.
at 595 n.5, Phillips is generally considered the case that settled the issue. Note, supra
note 30, at 423 n.69.
48 Phillips, 283 U.S. at 595; see also Note, supra note 30, at 422-23.
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property by eminent domain.49 In this case, the Court held, the
"need of the government promptly to secure its revenues" out-
weighs the individual's due process rights.50
In the circumstances of Phillips, a non-jeopardy situation, the
"eventual judicial review" upon which the Court relied to decide the
case was available to Phillips before5 1 as well as after 52 payment.
Thus, the Court did not actually examine the constitutionality of a
governmental seizure of funds prior to judicial review.53 Although
it did note that no prepayment remedy existed for a jeopardy as-
sessed taxpayer,54 the Court neither rejected jeopardy assessments
and pre-hearing seizures as unconstitutional, nor included them in
Phillips's approval of summary procedures with judicial review.55
Nevertheless, courts generally cite Phillips to support the proposi-
tion that jeopardy assessments per se do not violate due process. 5 6
More recently, in Fuentes v. Shevin,57 the Supreme Court set
forth three factors common to those cases in which the Court held a
prehearing seizure constitutional. First, "the seizure [must be] di-
rectly necessary to secure an important governmental or general
public interest."5 8 Second, "a special need for very prompt action"
must exist.5 9 Third, a government official must determine "under
the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and
justified in the particular instance."60
Arguably, all three factors exist in ajeopardy tax case. First, tax
collection clearly is an important governmental interest. 6' Second,
49 Phillips, 283 U.S. at 597.
50 Id at 596-97.
51 Id. at 598.
52 Id. at 597.
53 See Larry J. Roberts, Laing Down a Challenge: The Future of Due Process and Tax
Collections, 11 GONz. L. REv. 369, 385 (1976).
54 See Phillips, 283 U.S. 589.
55 See id. at 589.
56 See, e.g., Human Eng'g Inst. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 61, 65 (1973). But see
Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 631 (1976) (recognizing that the Phillips hold-
ing is narrower than the concept that jeopardy assessments are constitutional). See also
Roberts, supra note 53, at 385 (recognizing that Phillips is often incorrectly cited for the
proposition that jeopardy assessments are constitutional); Note, supra note 30, at 425.
57 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
58 Ia at 91.
59 Id
60 Id
61 See infra text accompanying note 161. The governmental interest in a jeopardy
tax case is significantly less compelling than its interest in many of the other cases in
which the Court allowed summary seizure of property. See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger &
Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (protecting public from misbranded drugs); Cof-
fin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (protecting public from a bank failure);
United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 540 (1921) (aiding in the war effort); North Am. Cold
Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (protecting public from contami-
nated food).
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in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,62 the Court held that a
"need for prompt action" exists when "preseizure notice and hear-
ing might frustrate the interests served by the statutes ....-" 63 Simi-
larly, in a jeopardy situation, a "special need for prompt action"
exists because notice to the taxpayer surely would frustrate the goal
of the statute. If he were aware of the Service's imminent assess-
ment and seizure, the taxpayer would likely hide his assets to avoid
payment of the tax.64 Finally, a government actor determines that a
jeopardy assessment is necessary and just. Thus, although Phillips
did not directly address the constitutionality of jeopardy assess-
ments,65 the Supreme Court's reasoning in Fuentes and Calero-Toledo
suggests that if it addressed the issue today, the Court would likely
hold jeopardy assessments constitutional.
D. The Failure of Remedies for the Taxpayer Rendered
Indigent by Jeopardy Assessment
Several avenues of relief from the hardships associated with
jeopardy assessment are generally available to jeopardy assessed
taxpayers. None of these remedies, however, is sufficient to obviate
the need for an attorney. First, the taxpayer may stay collection by
posting a bond equal to the amount of the assessment.66 This rem-
edy is not useful to the taxpayer whose assets have been seized by
the government because he will probably be unable to obtain such a
bond without security.67 One court described the bond provision as
"mere mockery." 68
Second, the Service offers two possible sources of administra-
tive relief: it may abate the jeopardy assessment on its own initia-
tive 69 or the taxpayer may seek administrative review.70 The Code
authorizes the Service to abate the assessment if the Secretary of the
Treasury or his delegate "finds that jeopardy does not exist." 71 If
the taxpayer requests that the Service review his assessment, the
62 416 U.S. 663 (1974). Calero-Toledo involved the seizure of a yacht after police
found marijuana on board. Because the yacht could easily be removed from the jurisdic-
tion or destroyed, the Court found that the circumstances warranted a prehearing
seizure.
63 Id. at 679.
64 See supra text accompanying note 30.
65 See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
66 I.R.C. § 6863(a).
67 Roberts, supra note 53, at 382. In addition, Roberts points out that the Service
generally will not jeopardy assess a taxpayer whose assets far exceed the amount of the
assessment. Thus, the bond remedy is meaningless in virtually all jeopardy cases. See
Comment, Jeopardy Assessment: The Sovereign's Stranglehold, 55 GEO. LJ. 701, 705 (1967).
68 Kimmel v. Tomlinson, 151 F. Supp. 901, 902 (S.D. Fla. 1957).
69 I.R.C. § 6861(g).
70 Id. § 7429(a)(2).
71 Id. § 6861(g).
1434 [Vol. 75:1426
1990] NOTE-DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS 1435
Secretary must determine (1) whether the making of the assessment
was "reasonable under the circumstances," 72 and (2) whether the
amount assessed is "appropriate under the drcumstances." T
Neither of these alternatives offers much comfort to the taxpayer,
however, because it is the district director of the Service who deter-
mines the existence, reasonablefiess, and appropriateness of the as-
sessment in the first place. 74
Third, the taxpayer may invoke Code section 6863(b)(3)(A),
which provides that property seized under section 6861 may not be
sold until the Tax Court reaches a final decision, or the time for
filing a petition in the Tax Court has expired. 75 At least one com-
mentator considers this Code section an important remedy,76 but its
utility is limited. Although it will prevent the sale of property at a
loss, it will not help a taxpayer pay for an attorney.
Prior to 1976, the Anti-Injunction Act7 7 prevented taxpayers
from obtaining any judicial relief from an assessment. 78 Congress
72 Id. § 7429(a)(3)(A).
73 Id. § 7429(a)(3)(B).
74 Roberts, supra note 53, at 382-83. Roberts further points out that it may be espe-
dally difficult to persuade the District Director to abate the jeopardy assessment when
the decision to assess had a nonrevenue motive, such as criminal law enforcement.
75 For further discussion of this safeguard, see id. at 383.
76 See id. Roberts posits that this stay of sale may be valuable to the taxpayer, if for
instance the Service has seized property of great sentimental value such as jewelry or a
personal automobile. Id.
77 I.R.C. § 7421(a) provides: "[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining the assess-
ment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court .. " For an account of
the legislative history of this section of the statute, see Comment, supra note 67, at 708
n.51.
78 Courts applied the Anti-Injunction Act in nearly an absolute manner, even as
they slowly created exceptions. In Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498
(1932), the Supreme Court found that if the Service successfully collected a year and a
half's back taxes from a corporation, the company would be ruined. The Court re-
treated from its previous literal interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act and held that
under the exceptional circumstances present in Miller, an injunction would issue. The
Court thus established the rule: "[I]n cases where complainant shows that in addition to
the illegality of an exaction in the guise of a tax there exist special and extraordinary
circumstances sufficient to bring the case within some acknowledged head of equity ju-
risprudence, a suit may be maintained to enjoin the collector." Id. at 509; see Comment,
supra note 67, at 710. Nonetheless, in the hundreds of cases where jeopardy assessed
taxpayers sought judicial relief, courts rarely found "exceptional circumstances." Id. at
712; cf. id at 715 (dim hope for equitable relief under the Standard Nut rationale).
In Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962), the Court lim-
ited the circumstances in which an injunction would issue to cases where the taxpayer
could prove two things: first, that the assessment will work irreparable harm; and sec-
ond, that under no circumstances would the government prevail. Id at 6-7.
Fourteen years later, the Supreme Court extended the taxpayer's rights under the
Anti-Injunction Act in Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614 (1976). Shapiro argued
that in order to meet the burden of showing that under no circumstances would the
government prevail, he had to have possession of the government's information which
stated on what basis the assessment was made. Id. at 626-27. The Court agreed, and
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then enacted Code section 7429, which permits review of ajeopardy
assessment by the federal district courts79 to determine whether an
assessment is "reasonable under the circumstances." 8 0 Previously,
the Service had free reign to act unreasonably, because the judicial
system did not monitor and constrain its activities. 8 ' This statute
represents an important step in the direction of protecting jeopardy
assessed taxpayers' rights, but it still does not provide for adequate
legal assistance. Given the complexity of the Code, it is difficult for
a jeopardy assessed taxpayer to refute the Service's assertion that
the assessment is reasonable, or to convince a court that the amount
is inappropriate, without the expertise of an attorney. The taxpayer
whose funds have been seized and who cannot afford an attorney is
left with a difficult decision if he cannot sustain his burden or refute
the government's evidence at this stage: he must either settle with
the Service or litigate the underlying tax issues without the assist-
ance of counsel.
II
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Criminal Defendants: The Right To Be Heard Includes the
Right To Be Heard by Counsel
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that all federal criminal defendants have the right to counsel.82
The Supreme Court did not recognize this right for defendants of
state prosecutions until 1932, when it decided the seminal case of
Powell v. Alabama.8 3 Thus began a thirty-year expansion of the right
held that the government must supply this information to the taxpayer. This holding
was incorporated into I.R.C. § 7429(a)(1).
79 Thus, judicial review ofjeopardy assessments is now an exception to the Anti-
Injunction Act. See I.R.C. § 7421(a).
80 Id. § 7429(b)(2)(A) & (B). The burden is on the Service to show that a jeopardy
assessment is reasonable under the circumstances. Id. § 7 429(g)(1). One court defined
the standard of proof required by the government as something more than "not arbi-
trary and capricious" and something less than "supported by substantial evidence."
Loretto v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 1168, 1172 (E.D. Pa. 1977). This standard has
been adopted by numerous other courts. See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 672 F. Supp.
1118 (S.D. Ind. 1987); Schmidtt v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 900 (D. Minn. 1987).
The taxpayer must show that the amount assessed is inappropriate. I.R.C.
§ 7429(g)(2).
81 See, e.g., AnthonyJ. Petrone, 18 T.C. Mem. 787 (1959) (Service assessed a tax of
$1,718,238 and penalties totalling $1,552,767 against a taxpayer whose net worth was
conceded to be $38,819); see also Jeopardy and Termination Assessments and Administrative
Summonses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administration of the Internal Revenue Code of the
Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 [hereinafter Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Administration of the I.R.C.].
82 The sixth amendment guarantees that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
83 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, the petitioners were illiterate black men convicted
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to counsel as applied to the states. An examination of several
cases8 4 reveals that many of the policy reasons underlying the right
to counsel in the criminal context also favor extending the right to
counsel to the jeopardy assessed taxpayer.8 5
The Powell Court extended to defendants of state criminal pros-
ecutions in capital cases the guarantee of counsel not by incorporat-
ing the sixth amendment into the fourteenth,8 6 but rather by
deeming the guarantee a fundamental element of due process. The
Court held that "it is the duty of the Court... to assign counsel for
[the defendant] as a necessary requisite of due process of law
.... ,,s In reaching its determination, the Court reasoned that a
hearing was among the prerequisites to a court's rendering of an
enforceable judgment. As such, a hearing constitutes an essential
element of due process, guaranteed by the Constitution.88 Signifi-
cantly, the Court also maintained that the right to an effective hear-
ing must include the aid of counsel.8 9 The Court recognized that a
layperson simply does not have the expertise to manipulate legal
concepts, the knowledge to monitor the procedural aspects of the
hearing, or the ability to present his own case.90
The Powell Court stated that:
If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were
arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and
appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted that such a
refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due pro-
cess in the constitutional sense.91
and sentenced to death for the rape of two white girls. The trial judge stated that during
arraignment he had "appointed all the members of the bar" as counsel, and that he
"anticipated that the members of the bar would continue to help the defendants if no
counsel appeared." l at 49. The morning of trial, Mr. Roddy, an attorney, appeared
"as a friend of the people who where interested," id. at 57 and offered to assist ap-
pointed counsel. Mr. Roddy stated "that he had not been given an opportunity to pre-
pare the case [and] that he was not familiar with the procedure in Alabama." Id A
member of the local bar then offered to assist Mr. Roddy and "help do anything I can
do." Id This was the extent of the representation received by the defendants.
84 For a more exhaustive review of the "right to counsel" cases, see Robert S. Catz
& Nancy Lee Firak, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Quasi-Criminal Cases: Towards an Effec-
tive Assistance of Counsel Standard, 19 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 397, 400-06 (1984).
85 Cf id. at 401 ("Review of this line of cases discloses that the same concerns ne-
cessitating the expansion of the right to counsel in the criminal context apply with equal
force to quasi-criminal litigation.").
86 Subsequently, however, the Court did incorporate the sixth amendment's guar-
antee of counsel in criminal prosecutions into the fourteenth amendment. See Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Catz & Firak, supra note 84, at 404.
87 Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
88 Id. at 68.
89 See id. at 68-69 ("The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.").
90 Id at 69.
91 Id. (emphasis added).
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Thus, the Powell Court emphasized that if an individual faces a tribu-
nal without counsel he will be denied due process. The Court held,
therefore, that an indigent defendant in a capital case has the right
to appointed counsel. The Court declined to speculate as to
whether the right to appointed counsel extends to defendants in
non-capital cases. 92
Ten years later, in Betts v. Brady,93 the Supreme Court adopted a
case-by-case method of determining whether due process de-
manded the appointment of counsel. It held that courts must make
this determination based on "an appraisal of the totality of facts" in
the particular case, and should only appoint counsel under special
circumstances. 94 Over the next twenty years, the Court broadened
this "special circumstances" category and made room for more and
more fact patterns.95
Finally, in 1963, the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright 96
presented the Court with facts nearly identical to those in Belts,97
and the Court took the opportunity to overrule the Betts case-by-
case test and the standard it created. 98 Injustifying its decision, the
Court emphasized the pro se defendant's powerlessness against the
vast resources of the state and the important role of attorneys in the
adversary system.99 Justice Black, writing for the Court, affirmed
the "noble ideal" of the "fair trial," 100 and deemed the right to
counsel for a criminal defendant "fundamental and essential." 10'
The same reasoning applies to the jeopardy assessed taxpayer. He
is no match for the government, which has the resources to take his
money without process and then employ effective counsel to litigate
the matter.10 2 Counsel is as essential to a fair trial for a jeopardy
92 Id. at 71.
93 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Betts was indicted under Maryland law for robbery. His
request for the assistance of counsel was denied pursuant to the county's practice of
providing counsel only for indigent defendants charged with rape or murder.
94 Id. at 462. In Betts, the defendant was a forty-three-year-old man "of ordinary
intelligence" who had previously been involved in a criminal trial. The Court held that
there were no "special circumstances" that would require the appointment of counsel.
Id. at 472.
95 Catz & Firak, supra note 84, at 403. For a list of cases in which the Court ex-
tended the aegis of "special circumstances" to the defendant, see id. at 403 n.25.
96 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Gideon, as in Betts, the defendant was charged with a
felony under state law. The defendant requested that the judge appoint counsel to rep-
resent him but the judge denied the request on the grounds that the state would only
appoint counsel in a capital case. Id. at 336-37.
97 Id. at 339.
98 Id. at 345.
99 Id. at 344; see also Catz & Firak, supra note 84, at 404.
100 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
101 Id Justice Black continued: "This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man
charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him." Id.
102 See infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
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assessed taxpayer as it is to the criminal defendant.
B. Recognition of Due Process Requirements: The Emerging
Right to Counsel in Non-Criminal Cases
1. The Initial Case: In re Gault 0 3
Prior to 1967, no court had recognized the right to counsel in
non-criminal cases. In In re Gault, the Supreme Court promulgated
such a right for the first time, using procedural due process as the
foundation. 10 4 The Court faced the issue of whether a child had the
constitutional right to appointed counsel to represent him in a de-
linquency hearing, where he was subject to be placed in a juvenile
state institution. 10 5 In reaching its decision, the Court found that
notwithstanding the label "civil," "[t]he juvenile needs the assist-
ance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled in-
quiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings and
to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit
it.' ' 1 6 This was a likely case to be the first in which the Court ex-
tended the right to counsel toward a civil litigant because the
threatened loss of physical liberty closely resembled that in a crimi-
nal proceeding. 10 7
Although the Court found significant the possible loss of the
defendant's physical liberty, it did leave "open the possibility that
cases not involving loss of physical liberty may still involve interests
sufficient to trigger a right to appointed counsel under the four-
teenth amendment."' 08 In addition, Gault clearly dispensed with the
notion that the label "civil" is incompatible with the right to an
attorney.
103 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
104 Note, Constitutional Rights and Civil Forfeiture Actions, 88 COLum. L. REv. 390, 401
n.65 (1988) (authored by Jay A. Rosenberg); see Gault, 387 U.S. 1.
105 See Gault, 387 U.S. 1. Historically, juvenile courts were intended to provide a
nonadversarial forum which disregarded punitive motives, and facilitated determina-
tions of what was in the best interests of the child. Id. at 14-16. The Court found,
however, that in practice the hearing very much resembled a criminal trial, the essential
difference being that procedural due process safeguards available to the criminal de-
fendant were ignored for the juvenile. Id at 29.
106 Id. at 36; see Catz & Firak, supra note 84, at 410-11.
107 Catz and Firak point out that the juvenile delinquency proceeding involved
"many of the characteristics of a criminal prosecution." Catz & Firak, supra note 84, at
410.
108 Note, supra note 104, at 401 n.65 (citing Jackson, Lassiter v. Department of So-
cial Services: The Due Process Right to Appointed Counsel Left Hanging Uneasily in the Mat-
thews v. Eldridge Balance, 8 N. Ky. L. REv. 513, 519 (1981)).
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2. The Case-By-Case Method Revisited: Gagnon v. Scarpelli
Gagnon v. Scarpelli 109 introduced to the civil arena the Betts case-
by-case method of determining whether due process requires the
assistance of counsel."10 After the Wisconsin Department of Public
Welfare revoked his probation,"'I Scarpelli argued that the state de-
nied him due process because it had not provided him with an attor-
ney.112 The Court held that the due process clause applied, but that
courts must determine the need for counsel for parole revocations
based on the facts of each case. 113
In applying the case-by-case approach to non-criminal cases,
the Court reasoned that in many instances there will be no need for
counsel in a revocation hearing because it differs so from a criminal
prosecution."14 The Court distinguished a revocation hearing from
a criminal prosecution on several grounds. First, in a revocation
hearing, a parole officer represents the state."15 Unlike an opposing
attorney, a parole officer is not necessarily the probationer's adver-
sary, and his attitude should reflect the rehabilitative focus of the
probation system.1 6 Second, no formal rules of evidence apply in a
revocation hearing which could confuse the probationer and pre-
109 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
110 Id. The "case-by-case approach" originally adopted in Betts v. Brady, see supra
notes 93-94 and accompanying text, was overruled and replaced with a per se rule in
Gideon v. Wainwright, see supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
111 Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 779-80. The Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972) found that "the revocation of parole is not a part of a criminal prosecution." Id.
at 480. Thus, Scarpelli was analyzed under the newly recognized right to counsel in the
civil arena.
112 Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 783. Petitioner also argued that his due process rights were
violated because there was no hearing to determine whether probation should have
been revoked. The Court held that this was indeed a denial of due process. Id at 782.
113 Id. at 787-88. The Court rejected the argument that the requirements of due
process were met through the existence of certain procedural safeguards such as notice
to Scarpelli of the claimed violation and the evidence against him, opportunity to be
heard and to present evidence, the right to confront witnesses, a "neutral and detached"
body to hear the claim, and a "written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence
relied on and reasons for revoking [probation or] parole." Id. at 786 (citing Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)). The Court recognized that:
[T]he effectiveness of the rights guaranteed by Morrissey may in some
circumstances depend on the use of skills which the probationer or pa-
rolee is unlikely to possess .... [Tihe unskilled or uneducated proba-
tioner or parolee may well have difficulty in presenting his version of a
disputed set of facts where the presentation requires the examining or
cross-examining of witnesses or the offering or dissecting of complex
documentary evidence.
Id. at 786-87.
114 Id. at 788-89.
115 Id. at 789.
116 See id. at 787 (adversarial nature of lawyers); id. at 785 (rehabilitative focus of
hearing).
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vent him from effectively presenting his case. 117 Third, the neces-
sity of protecting procedural rights by raising them in a timely
manner does not exist." 8 Finally, a revocation hearing does not in-
volve the problem of presenting a coherent defense to jurors." 19
3. A New Standard for the Determination of Due Process Issues
In Mathews v. Eldridge,120 the Supreme Court recognized that
"governmental decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or
'property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment"' 2 ' are subject to certain con-
stitutional constraints.' 22 The Court then articulated a new, three
factor standard for evaluating whether the requirements of proce-
dural due process have been met. In making a due process determi-
nation, a court must consider:
1. "JTlhe private interest that will be affected by the official
action;" 123
2. "[T]he Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail;' 24
3. "[T]he risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards."' 25
The Supreme Court first applied this new standard to the issue
of whether due process requires the assistance of counsel for a civil
litigant in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services. 126 In that case, the
State of North Carolina social services agency threatened an indi-
gent mother with the termination of her parental rights toward one
of her sons by bringing an action in the county district court.127
Recognizing that a party's right to appointed counsel decreases as
his liberty interest diminishes, the Court drew a "presumption" that
the defendant's right to appointed counsel exists "only when, if he
117 Id at 789.
I18 Id.
119 Id
120 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The due process issue in Eldridge was whether the Constitu-
tion requires that a judicial hearing be held before the Social Security Administration
can terminate an individual's disability benefits. Id. at 323. The Social Security Admin-
istration conceded that the receipt of the benefits was a "property" interest within the
meaning of the due process clause, id. at 332, but disputed Eldridge's contention that his
due process rights were violated because of the absence of a pretermination hearing.
121 Id at 332.
122 Id
123 It at 335.
124 Id
125 Id.
126 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
127 It at 20.
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loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty."1 28 The Court
propounded the idea that it must balance all other aspects of the
determination of due process against this Lassiter presumption. 129
Examining the first Eldridge factor, the Court recognized that
the mother has a "commanding" interest in a termination proceed-
ing.'3 0 The Court then discussed the state's interest and deter-
mined that it had virtually no opposing interest. 131 Finally, the
Court considered the third Eldridge factor: the risk, in this case, that
"a parent will be erroneously deprived of his or her child because
the parent is not represented by counsel."' 1 2 In evaluating this risk,
the Court acknowledged the potential complexity of the issues in-
volved in a termination proceeding, the possibility that expert testi-
mony can confuse a layperson, and that the parents involved are
likely to be uneducated. 33
The Court then balanced the three Eldridge factors against the
Lassiter presumption that the right to counsel only applies when
physical liberty is threatened. In doing so, the Court conceded that
if "the parent's interests were at their strongest, the State's interests
were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak,"' 134
128 Id at 26-27. This "presumption" has been severely criticized by commentators.
For a discussion of this criticism, see Note, supra note 104, at 402 n.71.
129 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27. This presumption against providing counsel is particu-
larly harsh when the state is the opposing party. One commentator has suggested that
when the state is really the opposing party and an indigent's fundamental interests are at
stake, "due process and fundamental fairness require a presumption in favor of ap-
pointed counsel." Note, supra note 8, at 628 (emphasis added). This commentator
posits that termination of parental rights and paternity actions are among those cases
where the presumption should be reversed from that which the Lassiter Court set forth.
Id. This Note suggests that another factor which should reverse the Lassiter presumption
is the extremely high risk of error present in tax litigation.
130 The Court recognized the mother's interest to be "an important interest that
'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protec-
tion.' . . . A parent's interest in the accuracy and injustice of the decision to terminate
his or her parental status is, therefore a commanding one." Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27
(quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)); see also id. at 38-40 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (discussion of the cases supporting family rights).
131 Id at 27-28. The Court pointed out that the State's interest is in the welfare of
the child and perhaps may best be served by "a hearing in which both the parent and the
State acting for the child are represented by counsel, without whom the contest of inter-
ests may become unwholesomely unequal." Id. at 28. The Court noted that the State's
financial interest differs from that of the parent's in that the State may wish to proceed as
economically as possible, thereby eliminating the cost of appointed counsel. I How-
ever, the Court recognized that this concern, albeit a legitimate one, does not outweigh
the important private interests of the mother, particularly since the potential costs are
minimal.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 30. Obviously, a parent whom the trial "overwhelms" is not likely to be
able competently to present her version of the facts. Cf id. at 46 (Blackmun,J. dissent-
ing) (the idea that what is involved in a court proceeding may "overwhelm an uncoun-
seled parent" is a "profound understatement").
134 Id. at 31.
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the factors would outweigh the presumption and a court would have
to provide counsel.13 5 But the Court found that "the Eldridge factors
will not always be so distributed. . . .,u36 In other words, the weight
of these factors will vary depending on the circumstances in each
case. The Court therefore adopted the Scarpelli case-by-case ap-
proach, 37 in which the trial court determines in each termination
proceeding whether due process requires the appointment of
counsel. 138
Once the Court chose to apply the Scarpelli case-by-case ap-
proach, the application involved only the determination of the risk
of error, 139 because the Court had already examined both the
state 40 and private' 4 ' interests. Despite the weighty private inter-
est, 142 the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not vio-
late her due process rights by failing to appoint counsel for her 143
because "the presence of counsel for Ms. Lassiter could not have
made a determinative difference" in the outcome. 144
In an adamant dissent,' 45 Justice Blackmun argued that the risk
of error will always be substantial 46 because a termination proceed-
ing resembles a criminal prosecution.' 47 Justice Blackmun reached
this conclusion after considering a variety of factors: the proceeding
'35 Id.
136 Itd
137 See-supra text accompanying notes 109-13.
138 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32.
139 See id. at 32-34.
140 See supra note 131; see also Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
141 See supra note 130; see also Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
142 See supra note 130.
143 The Court refuted Lassiter's argument that counsel was essential to her case.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, explained that since there were no allegations
of neglect or abuse on which criminal charges could be brought, no expert witnesses
testified, and there were "no specially troublesome points of law" an attorney would not
have made a difference, notwithstanding problems such as the trial court's admission of
hearsay evidence. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-33.
144 Id. This conclusion is distressing because it is difficult to believe that an appel-
late court can accurately determine that a lawyer would not have helped, when this de-
termination is based on a record that was developed by a non-lawyer.
145 Id at 35-59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun disagreed with the majority's
analysis on several points. First, Blackmun argued that since parental rights, as recog-
nized by the majority, are "commanding," and since there exists "no countervailing
state interest of even remotely comparable significance ... the obvious conclusion [is]
that due process requires the presence of counsel for a parent threatened withjudicial
termination of parental rights ...." Id. at 35.
Blackmun also disputed the Court's finding that precedent supports the "presump-
tion" that due process only mandates appointed counsel when physical liberty is
threatened. Id. at 40. He considered incarceration "to be neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for requiring counsel on behalf of an indigent defendant." Id.
146 Blackmun concluded that combined with the other Eldridge factors, the risk of
error "assumes extraordinary proportions." Id. at 46-47.
147 Id. at 42-47.
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is "formal and adversarial;" 148 it has an "accusatory and punitive
focus; ' ' 149 a gross disparity in power exists between the state and the
individual;' 50 and the state has expert counsel. 5 1 In addition, Jus-
tice Blackmun suggested that the likelihood of error increases be-
cause of the legal standards against which a court might judge the
parent's interest.1 52 Finally, Justice Blackmun added that the legal
issues with which the parent must deal "are neither simple nor easily
defined."1 53
C. The Denial of Due Process: No Attorney Provided for the
Jeopardy Assessed Taxpayer
The Blackmun factors enumerated above also typify a tax pro-
ceeding, and increase the risk of error if a jeopardy assessed tax-
payer must litigate his claim without the aid of counsel.' 4  In
addition, the intricacies specifically associated with tax law enhance
this risk,155 and suggest that the Scarpelli case-by-case determination
of whether due process demands an attorney, as adopted in Lassiter,
is inappropriate for tax disputes.
Although courts have slowly begun to recognize the necessity
of counsel in some non-criminal proceedings, this new expansion of
the constitutional right to counsel has not yet been extended to in-
clude the jeopardy assessed taxpayer.' 56 However, the evolution of
the Supreme Court's reasoning and its recognition of the right to
counsel in certain non-criminal situations, together with the policies
supporting extension of this right toward these taxpayers, indicate
148 Id. at 42-43 (adjudication is by a state judge; formal rules of evidence and proce-
dure apply; hearsay is inadmissible; records must be authenticated).
149 Id. at 43. But see id. at 34 (Burger, CJ., concurring) (arguing that the focus of
termination proceedings is protection of the child's interests, rather than punishment).
150 Id at 43, 46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The "lawyer has access to public records
concerning the family and to professional social workers who are empowered to investi-
gate the family situation and to testify against the parent." Id. at 43. "When the parent
is indigent, lacking in education, and easily intimidated by figures of authority, the im-
balance may well become insuperable." Id. at 46.
151 Id. at 43.
152 Id. at 44-45 (the parent must contend with legal concepts such as: "without
cause," ".concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare," "willfully," "substantial
progress has been made," "diligent efforts of the Department of Social Services," ".to
make and follow through with constructive planning").
153 Id at 45.
154 See infra text accompanying notes 167-73.
155 See infra text accompanying note 173.
156 See, e.g., Lloyd v. Patterson, 242 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1957); United States v. Brod-
son, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957); Shapiro v. Commissioner,
73 T.C. 313 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1082 (1981); Human Eng'g Inst. v. Commis-
sioner, 61 T.C. 61 (1973). In each of the above cases, the jeopardy assessed taxpayer
was denied funds to pay an attorney.
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that the Supreme Court should soon recognize the due process
right to counsel for jeopardy assessed taxpayers.
III
THE JEOPARDY ASSESSED TAXPAYER AND THE AS-YET-
UNRECOGNIZED RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Precedent Favors the Right to Counsel for All Jeopardy
Assessed Taxpayers
The three Eldridge factors-the taxpayer's property interest, the
risk of error, and the governmental interest' 57-balanced against
the Lassiter presumption that the right to counsel applies only when
physical liberty is at stake' 5 8 militate in favor of extending the right
of counsel to jeopardy assessed taxpayers.
1. Application of the Eldridge Factors to the Jeopardy Assessed
Taxpayer
The jeopardy assessed taxpayer has a great property interest at
stake. A jeopardy assessment can affect virtually all of a person's
belongings. In addition to seizing the taxpayer's cash, the Service
may put liens on his home, his mode of transportation, and his
means of earning a living.'5 9 Indeed, a taxpayer "may be rendered
indigent overnight"' 60 by the government's actions. On the other
hand, the government also has an important interest. "The collec-
tion of taxes is a sine qua non of a nation's existence. Without reve-
157 See supra discussion of the Eldridge factors in text accompanying notes 120-25.
158 See supra discussion of the Lassiter presumption in text accompanying notes 128-
29.
159 See, e.g., Kimmel v. Tomlinson, 151 F. Supp. 901 (S.D. Fla. 1957) (Service seized
"every bit" of the taxpayer's property); see Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administration of
the LR.C., supra note 81, at 64 n.149, which included this commentary:
Although early cases allowed injunctions against assessments the en-
forcement of which would deprive the taxpayer of his livelihood and re-
duce his family to destitution, Macejko v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 87
(N.D. Ohio 1959); Arnold v. Cobb, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9711 (N.D. Ga.
1957); Long v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 758 (S.D. Ala. 1957), that
result is no longer possible. McClure v. Roundtree, 330 F.2d 954 (6th
Cir. 1964); Johnson v. Wall, 329 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1964); Botta v. Scan-
Ion, 314 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1963).
See also SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, COLLECTION
OF DELINQUENT TAXEs, A REPORT TO THE STEERING COMM. FOR THE INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE PROJECT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 64 (1976) [hereinafter COLLECTION OF DELINQUENT TAXES] ("nor-
mally all assets will have been seized" from a jeopardy assessed taxpayer); id. at 65
("The jeopardy assessment may be of such magnitude as to force the taxpayer out of his
home and destroy his business, not to mention his reputation. It may strip the taxpayer
of all means of supporting himself or his family."); I.R.C. § 6321 (Service may put liens
on virtually all property).
160 Comment, supra note 67, at 704.
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nues, it could not amass the manpower or resources necessary"'16 1
to sustain a functioning government.
Yet, the government's interest cannot and should not extend
beyond the collection of money legitimately due under the Constitu-
tion and the tax laws. The sixteenth amendment empowered Con-
gress to tax "income"; 162 Congress enacted statutes to define
income and to assess a certain portion of that income. To the extent
that the Service jeopardy assesses and keeps money in excess of the
statutorily defined portion of income that the taxpayer owes, it has
acted in wrongful disregard of the tax laws.' 63
Furthermore, the government's interest in collecting taxes does
not necessarily conflict with the taxpayer's interest in having access
to his funds to hire an attorney. By implementing the jeopardy as-
sessment provision, Congress did not seek to preserve assets which
the taxpayer might otherwise use to secure legal counsel; rather,
Congress sought to prevent the taxpayer from hiding his assets or
removing them from the country. 164 In a non-jeopardy situation, an
individual may use his last dollar to defend himself against a pro-
posed assessment, as long as the Service does not believe that the
taxpayer intends to flee the country. Thus, it is both inconsistent
and unjust to deny the jeopardy taxpayer the same ability to hire
legal counsel.
Finally, the government's interest would be compromised only
slightly, if at all, if a court allowed the taxpayer to use the seized
funds to hire an attorney. Regardless of the amount spent on attor-
ney fees, the taxpayer ultimately would owe whatever a court deter-
mined to be the accurate assessment. Although the government
would not have possession of the money spent on attorney's fees
and would have to use another means of collection, this is true for
non-jeopardy assessed taxpayers as well.
The weight of the last Eldridge factor-in this case, the risk of
erroneously depriving the taxpayer of his property-is very great
when ajeopardy assessed taxpayer must litigate without an attorney.
First, unlike a probation revocation hearing, 16 5 the judicial determi-
nation of taxes owed includes many of the Blackmun factors that
weigh in favor of appointing counsel. 16 6 Second, because tax law is
a highly specialized and intricate field, it is particularly unlikely that
161 COLLECTION OF DELINQUENT TAXES, supra note 159, at 27.
162 U.S. CONST. amend XVI; cf. I.R.C. § 61 ("gross income means all income from
whatever source derived").
163 See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
164 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
165 See supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gagnon v.
Scarpelli.
166 See supra text accompanying notes 145-53.
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a pro se litigant can adequately represent himself in the determina-
tion of his tax liability.
Many of the Blackmun factors 6 7 exist in any tax case. First, like
a criminal prosecution, tax litigation is both adversarial and for-
mal.' 68 Both parties must argue that the same tax laws support their
opposing positions. The Service seeks to collect as much money as
possible from the taxpayer; the taxpayer wants to prevent this from
happening. In addition, like the termination hearing in Lassiter,16 9 a
tax proceeding is formal. In order to represent himself adequately,
the taxpayer may have to make motions, request documents, or take
other "legal" actions he is not competent to perform.
The second Blackmun factor, the accusatory and punitive na-
ture of the proceeding, 170 exists here as well. It is difficult to imag-
ine an individual who would not feel persecuted by the government
after the Service takes his money, forces him to initiate suit for a
refund, puts the burden of proof on his shoulders as the plaintiff,
and finally, informs him that he must await a post-trial determina-
tion of whether he had the right to an attorney.
The disparity in power between the litigants, 171 and the exper-
tise of the government's counsel, 172 the third and fourth Blackmun
factors, also greatly enhance the risk of error. The Service has taken
all of the taxpayer's resources and left him completely unable to
contest the action. Moreover, the government's advocate is not the
local legal aid clinic, but the United States Justice Department: the
Service is well represented by counsel.
In addition to a risk of error analogous to that in a criminal
prosecution, tax litigation involves a highly complex set of statutes.
An individual untrained in tax law could not possibly chart his way
through the various applicable Code sections and Treasury Regula-
tions. Even an otherwise competent lawyer, without some experi-
ence in the field of tax law, would be hard pressed to accurately
determine and argue for the correct amount of tax.173
167 Id.
168 See supra note 148.
169 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
170 See supra note 149.
171 See supra note 150.
172 See supra note 151.
173 Without some expertise and familiarity with the Tax Code it would be virtually
impossible for an individual with enough money to have attracted the Service's attention
to be able to argue his position. To begin with, the Internal Revenue Code fills 1678
pages of the United States Code. See Title 26, U.S.C. Moreover, the Code is highly
complicated, containing many interrelated sections. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 170, providing for
a charitable contribution deduction. Section 170 fills fourteen and one-half pages of the
United States Code, 26 U.S.C. § 170 (1988), and incorporates numerous other Code
sections. In addition, there are a number of interrelated Code sections which are not
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The second part of the Eldridge "risk of error" factor focuses on
the likely value of procedural safeguards in protecting the litigant's
interests. 174 In a jeopardy case virtually no such remedies or proce-
dural rights protect the taxpayer.1 7-5 As Justice Powell found in Ga-
gnon v. Scarpelli,176 rights such as the ability to confront a witness and
the opportunity to be heard are meaningless when the individual
lacks the skill to make effective use of these protections.1 7
2. Eldridge Factors vs. Lassiter Presumption: The Risk of
Erroneous Deprivation Outweighs the Presumption Against
the Right to an Attorney
As the majority in Lassiter178 determined, a court must balance
the three Eldridge factors 179 against the presumption that the right to
counsel exists only when physical liberty is at stake. 8 0 If the
Supreme Court were only to consider the two conflicting interests-
the taxpayer's and the government's-then the Lassiter presumption
against counsel would likely outweigh these interests, and no consti-
tutional right to counsel would exist.' 8 ' After all, several Supreme
Court opinions have made clear that the Court values property
rights less dearly than the rights to life and liberty.'8 2 However,
when the third Eldridge factor, the risk of erroneously depriving an
individual of his property, 83 is as great as it is here,' 8 4 the Court
cross-referenced, so that even if a taxpayer could read and apply the Code sections, he
would not necessarily know to do so. For instance, Code § 1001 provides for the recog-
nition and realization of gain. However, nowhere in the section does it say that Code
§§ 1245 and 1250 overrule § 1001 in the case of certain depreciable assets. Code
§§ 1245 and 1250 state that if property defined within those sections is disposed of, gain
shall be recognized according to those sections, "notwithstanding any other provision of
this subtitle." I.R.C. §§ 1245(a)(1), 1250(a)(1). See also the title to a recent article ap-
pearing in The Wall Street Journal indicating a general sense of incomprehensibility
regarding the tax system: Codified Confusion Tax Law is Growing Ever More Complex, Outcy
Ever Louder-Even Legislators Who Wrote it Sometimes are Baffled; Advisors Refuse to Advise-For
Small Business, a Disaster, The Wall Street Journal, April 12, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
174 See supra text accompanying note 123.
175 See supra subpart I(D) of this Note.
176 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
177 See supra note 113.
178 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
179 See supra text accompanying notes 123-25.
180 See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
181 In Lassiter, the extraordinarily important individual interest in maternal rights
combined with the weak, opposing state interest did not outweigh the presumption
against counsel because the majority determined that the risk of error under the circum-
stances of that case was very low. 452 U.S. at 18. Certainly a taxpayer's monetary inter-
est cannot compare with the threat of being stripped of motherhood. Thus, without the
"risk of error" consideration, jeopardy assessed taxpayers would not have a right to
counsel under the Court's present formulation.
182 See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
183 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
184 See supra text accompanying notes 165-73.
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should recognize that due process demands that the taxpayer have
the right to counsel. When the risk of error is so substantial, and
the government has, in effect, prevented an individual from ob-
taining counsel, courts should find that these facts outweigh the
Lassiter presumption.
3. The Scarpelli Case-By-Case Method Is Inappropriate for Jeopardy
Assessed Taxpayers
The Scarpelli Court's rationale for determining case-by-case
whether due process requires the appointment of an attorney does
not apply in the jeopardy assessment context. In Scarpelli, the Court
focused on the differences between a revocation hearing and a crim-
inal proceeding in determining that "the need or the likelihood in a
particular case for a constructive contribution by counsel" will not
always arise.18 5 A tax proceeding, on the other hand, does resemble
a criminal prosecution, 186 and the counsel's contribution is not only
constructive but necessary.
The Scarpelli Court also observed that in many instances, any
evidence that would mitigate the case against the probationer would
be "so simple as not to require either investigation or exposition by
counsel."' 1 7 This is not necessarily true in tax cases, because these
cases often require the taxpayer to explain much more complicated
problems and address more substantial legal issues than simply, e.g.,
why he violated parole.
B. Policy Considerations Demand Due Process for the
Taxpayer
As the Court recognized in Powell v. Alabama,'88 if a court were
"arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel.., such a refusal
would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in the
constitutional sense."' 1 9 The Powell Court further recognized that
"the right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel."' 190 This right to
be heard is a minimum due process requirement in civil, as well as
criminal, cases. 191 Nevertheless, courts have allowed the govern-
ment to prevent the taxpayer from being heard by counsel by depriv-
185 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973).
186 See supra text accompanying notes 167-72.
187 Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 787.
188 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
189 Id at 69; see also supra text accompanying note 91.
190 Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
191 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1972) ("[D]ue process requires, at a
minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons
forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given
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ing him of the means of hiring counsel to protect him from the
"machinery" of the state.19 2
The unfairness of government actions which prevent an individ-
ual from paying for an attorney is exacerbated in jeopardy assess-
ment cases because of their noncriminal nature. If the defendant in
a criminal case, for example a RICO indictment, is unable to pay for
a meaningful opportunity to be heard."); see also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545
(1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
192 See United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911
(1957). The Service jeopardy assessed Brodson, who was subsequently indicted for
criminal tax evasion. Brodson argued that as a result of the jeopardy assessment, he was
unable to obtain an accountant to help defend him in the criminal proceeding, and that
he was being denied his constitutional rights to counsel. The court held in favor of the
prosecution, but ChiefJudge Duffy, in his dissent, recognized that:
[T]he Government, by its deliberate act, by a jeopardy assessment,
captured the defendant's assets and thus denied him the use of his own
funds to defend himself; the tools of defense were taken from him; the
Government pauperized him by placing him in a financial straight-jacket
.... The tactics of the Government in this case in preventing defendant
from utilizing the necessary tools of defense certainly offends my sense of
justice.
Id. at 111.
Commentators have recently asserted a similar complaint against criminal fee forfei-
ture statutes. The 1984 Forfeiture Act, which was passed as part of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, allows prosecutors to obtain a restraining order forbidding
an individual from transferring his assets to anyone. This has been held to include fees
paid to an attorney. The Act was passed to prevent defendants from avoiding the effects
of criminal forfeiture laws which are a part of the RICO and CCE statutes, by transfer-
ring assets to others. These commentators have argued that because fees paid to attor-
neys do not have statutory immunity from forfeiture, private attorneys will refuse to
represent anyone whose assets are subject to forfeiture. Morgan Cloud, Government In-
trusions into the Attorney-Client Relationship: The Impact of Fee Forfeiture on the Balance of Power
in the Adversary System of Criminal Justice, 36 EMORY L.J. 817, 825-26 (1987); William J.
Genego, The Legal and Practical Implications of Forfeiture of Attorney's Fees, 36 EMORY L.J. 837,
841 (1987). Thus, these statutes could also prevent the defendant from hiring an attor-
ney. Genego, supra note 193, at 837.
The Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered
v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989). In Caplin, defense counsel challenged the valid-
ity of a forfeiture statute, arguing that, as applied to attorney fees, the statute violates
the sixth amendment right to counsel of one's choice. Id. at 2651. The Court stated that
the right to counsel of one's choice only protects "the individual's right to spend his
own money to obtain the advice and assistance of ... counsel." Id. at 2652 (citing
Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 370 (1985)). The fee
forfeiture statute includes a "relation back" provision which states that title to the for-
feited funds vests in the United States as of the commission of the act which gave rise to
forfeiture. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (1982 & Supp. V); see also Caplin, 109 S. Ct. at 2652-53.
The Caplin Court relied on this relation back provision to hold that the defendant has no
sixth amendment right to use the forfeited funds to pay for counsel of his choice because
the funds belong to the government. Id. The Court, however, ignored the possibility
that the defendant may be acquitted, in which case title to the funds would not have
vested in the United States.
For further explanation of the effects of the Forfeiture Act, see Cloud, supra;
Genego, supra, at 841.
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an attorney, the government provides one for him. 193 Here, the
government renders some taxpayers indigent, 94 but because courts
generally do not provide attorneys for civil litigants, the taxpayer is
represented by no one.
Although courts consider certain protections less necessary in a
civil trial than in a criminal prosecution, 195 surely the requirement
of fundamental fairness exists for the civil litigant. The Constitution
mandates that "[n]o person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . -196 The jeopardy as-
sessed taxpayer has not been accorded due process when the gov-
ernment's actions place his property at such great risk of an
erroneous deprivation. The "noble ideal" of the "fair trial"' 1 7
should extend to civil litigants so that the government can no longer
prevent a jeopardy assessed taxpayer from hiring counsel by deny-
ing him access to his seized funds.
C. Recommendations in Light of the Necessity for an Attorney
in Jeopardy Cases
The right to counsel should extend to all jeopardy assessed tax-
payers. However, courts should not go to the extreme of ap-
pointing counsel at the government's expense for two reasons.
First, a pool of attorneys to represent these taxpayers does not exist.
A public defender may adequately represent an indigent criminal
defendant because the public defender is trained and experienced in
criminal defense work. However, because the Code is so complex
and tax is such a specialized field, a litigator inexperienced in tax law
would be unable to render effective assistance to the taxpayer. 198
Second, a jeopardy assessed taxpayer is no more deserving of free
counsel than is a non-jeopardy assessed taxpayer because in both
cases the taxpayer presumably can afford to pay an attorney.
The jeopardy assessed taxpayer, however, should have limited
access to his seized funds. A non-jeopardy assessed taxpayer may
193 See discussion of the right to an attorney in criminal cases, supra subsection 2(A).
But see Morgan Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorney's Fees: Applying an Institutional Role Theory
to Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 1, 37. Cloud argues that in
some circumstances the defendants in these forfeiture actions will be unable to use their
assets to procure private counsel, yet they will not qualify as indigents and may not be
able to get appointed counsel. But, he also notes that "the Justice Department asserts it
would not contest such appointments" in those situations. Id. at 39.
194 United States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107, 111 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911
(1957).
195 For example, the burden of proof is significantly lighter in a civil trial than in a
criminal case.
196 U.S. Const. amend. V.
197 See supra text accompanying note 100.
198 See supra subpart III(A)(1) of this Note.
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spend as much money as he wishes on attorney fees. If, by virtue of
having paid his attorney's fees, he is left without funds to pay a tax
liability, the Service must collect the debt as best it can. Allowing a
jeopardy assessed taxpayer access to his funds to secure counsel,
upon a finding that he has no other means of meeting this expense,
would place the jeopardy assessed taxpayer in much the same posi-
tion as the non-jeopardy taxpayer. This is a logical result because
the only asserted difference between the two is that the jeopardy
assessed taxpayer was more likely to leave the country or hide his
assets to avoid paying a tax liability,' 9 9 not that he was more likely to
spend money to dispute his tax liability.200
Courts have long considered Phillips v. Commissioner20 1 to stand
for the proposition that jeopardy assessments are constitutional. 202
In addition, the Supreme Court has held summary seizures constitu-
tional when preseizure notice would frustrate the purposes of the
statute, as it would in this case. The Supreme Court is therefore
unlikely to declare jeopardy assessments unconstitutional. 203 None-
theless, Congress should amend the jeopardy assessment provision
to provide for a court-administered escrow account. A court could
mandate reasonable fees and prevent the taxpayer from using the
money for frivolous expenses. The government would still be as-
sured that the taxpayer could not hide or abscond with his assets.
This would protect the government's interests and simultaneously
assure that a jeopardy assessed taxpayer was not precluded by the
government's actions from receiving adequate representation.
CONCLUSION
Courts have held that existing jeopardy assessment procedures
do not violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment. How-
ever, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution is not
stagnant. The right to counsel has been evolving, and the Court has
held more and more often that civil litigants in certain types of cases
have a due process right to counsel. Under current doctrine, a jeop-
ardy assessed taxpayer must wait until after trial to determine
whether he was denied due process rights because the Service
seized his property and left him without sufficient funds to pay for
199 See supra note 20.
200 See supra text accompanying note 40.
201 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
202 See supra note 56.
203 One commentator has noted that "[c]ourts overwhelmingly rely upon demo-
cratic institutions to remedy abuses in taxation, rather than exercising a strong hand in
judicial review." Gale Ann Norton, The Limitless Federal Taxing Power, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 591, 591 (1985). The author discusses the heavy presumption in favor of holding
any tax statute constitutional. Id. at 621.
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an attorney. Based on the longstanding history of the jeopardy as-
sessment, the Supreme Court is not likely to declare the statute un-
constitutional, but the Court should recognize the existence of the
right to counsel for a jeopardy assessed taxpayer whom the Service
renders indigent. Moreover, Congress should amend the statute to
make the taxpayer's seized assets available for the limited purpose
of paying attorney's fees.
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